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The Standard of Review

I.

In his opening brief, ﬁled April 23,

Appellant Gerald Ross Pizzuto,
since the district court’s ruling

2020

The

State disagrees in

“Opening Brief” 0r “AOB”),

asserted that the standard of review here should be de novo,

Jr.

was based 0n

answering

its

De Novo

(hereinafter

strictly legal

legitimately call for relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b), not

at 4.

Is

brief,

determinations about what situations

on contested

factual assessments. See

AOB

ﬁled June 26, 2020 (hereinafter “Answering

Brief" or “Ans. BL”), insisting that the applicable test

is

for abuse of discretion. See Ans. Br. at

13—14. Although the State concedes that a district court’s interpretation 0f the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure

is

subject to de

novo review under Eby

believes the ultimate decision 0n Rule 60(b)

What

the State does not explain

is

how

its

still

v.

State,

148 Idaho 731 (2010),1

demands deference. See Ans.

approach would allow for

this

it

Br. at 13—14.

Court t0 use

its

independent judgment in evaluating the meaning 0f I.R.C.P. 60(b). Indeed, the State does not
dispute Mr. Pizzuto’s point that the district court’s decision below
analysis 0f I.R.C.P. 60(b), and that

would

its

judgment

elicit

become meaningless. More
would become

clearly not

1

this

entirely

did not involve any disputed factual matters.

any deference?

independent assessment from

statutes

it

ﬂowed

If it did, the language

from

its

Why,

legal

then,

from Eby—requiring an

Court on the legal signiﬁcance of I.R.C.P. 60(b)—would

broadly, under the State’s method, the content of all rules and

largely dictated

by Idaho’s

how the judiciary is supposed t0

district judges,

work. See,

e.g.,

State

and not by
v.

A11 citation conventions here are the same as in the Opening Brief.

1

this Court.

That

Guzman, 122 Idaho 981,

is

987 (1992)

(reiterating that

it is

ultimately this tribunal’s duty t0 establish precedent for the

lower Idaho courts to follow).
In a similar move, the State takes exception t0 Mr. Pizzuto’s position that de

is

appropriate in part because the district judge below

was not involved

in the original

proceedings. See Ans. Br. at 14. The State implies that Mr. Pizzuto’s logic
the Court’s precedent. See

suitable for circumstances in

0f the relevant proceedings

Law Enforcement,
district court

t0

T0

id.

district court

was

lacked such an opportunity, there

By the same token,
is

its

factual determinations);

(Alaska 1999) (applying de novo review t0 a

motion because

it

was based 0n a purely

employed, and de novo review

that

is

trial

v.

Idaho Dep ’t 0f

stands t0 reason that

when a

v.

J.S.,

420 P.3d 128, 133 (Utah

Dixon

v.

Ct.

App.

Rule 60(b) case and

Pouncy, 979 P.2d 520, 523

court’s reasoning in denying a Rule 60(b)

Why the

abuse-of—discretion test should be

in order.

Mr. Pizzuto Adequately Argued Abuse Of Discretion

Although he advocated
in the alternative that

it

Hughes

legal analysis).

In sum, the State has n0 rationale for

II.

e.g.,

court’s strictly legal conclusions independently in a

only affording deference t0

is

less cause for the abuse-of—discretion standard

be used. See Blackhawk Townhouses Owners ASS ’n
trial

inconsistent with

able to rely 0n ﬁrst-hand observations

well-established and universal. See,

129 Idaho 558, 562 (1996).

2018) (reviewing a

is

the contrary, the notion that the abuse-of—discretion standard

which the

is

novo review

for

de novo review in his Opening Brief, Mr. Pizzuto contended

he could show an abuse 0f discretion. See

Mr. Pizzuto forfeited any claim

AOB at 4.

The

to relief under the abuse-of—discretion test

State maintains

by insufﬁciently

addressing
will

it.

See Ans. Br.

conﬁrm, the State

is

As

at 15.

a straightforward review of Mr. Pizzuto’s Opening Brief

mistaken. Mr. Pizzuto set forth in detail

opinion was inconsistent With the applicable legal standards, and
t0

an abuse 0f discretion. See

(2012) (ﬁnding that the

AOB

at 8, 15, 21;

district court

The

applicable legal standards).

abused

its

State cannot

see also State

discretion

by

v.

how the

district court’s

how that inconsistency pointed
Hanson, 152 Idaho

3 14, 321

acting inconsistently with the

Wish these passages out of existence by ignoring

them, and Mr. Pizzuto preserved his appeal t0 the abuse-of—discretion standard.
III.

With respect

The Rule

60(b) Motion

Was

Timely

t0 timeliness, the State’s overarching mistake is to rely

0n the wrong body

of law. In the State’s opinion, Mr. Pizzuto was required t0 submit his motion t0

judgment within forty-two days of when the U.S. Supreme Court released
Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014). See Ans. Br. at 24—25. That timeline

§ 19-2719(5),

brought no

amend

opinion in Hall

v.

comes from Idaho Code

under Which a successive post—conviction petition in a capital case must be

later

than forty-two days after the inmate “knew 0r reasonably should have

the claim.” Pizzuto

The

its

alter 0r

v.

State,

146 Idaho 720, 727 (2008).

State overlooks the fact that Mr. Pizzuto

post-conviction petition.

He

known 0f

is

is

not reopening his case With a successive

reopening his case with a motion t0

alter 0r

amend judgment

pursuant t0 I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). The State does not offer a single authority to support the
proposition that a Rule 60(b) motion

2719(5) and the cases interpreting

own restrictions on timing,

it.

is

subj ect t0 the timelines set forth in Idaho

It is

Code

§ 19-

an understandable omission. Rule 60(b) carries

its

namely, six months for certain types of motions and “a reasonable

time” for

all

0f them. I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1).

“contr01[s] over the

more

It is

a rudimentary principle of law that the speciﬁc

general.” First Fed. Sav.

154 Idaho 626, 632 (2012). In

this instance, the

Bank ofTwin Falls

more speciﬁc clause

is

v.

Riedesel Eng’g, Ina,

Rule 60(b), Which was

designed t0 cover the exact type 0f motion under review now, rather than Idaho Code § 192719(5), which encompasses any capital post—conviction action. Consistent with those
foundational principles, the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized a distinction between the

ﬁling of a Rule 60(b) motion and the ﬁling of a
that circumstances

may permit the

former even

new post-conviction petition, and has
if they

preclude the

See Parvin

latter.

accepted

v.

State,

157Idah0518,521(CkhApp.2014);LQpezv.Sane,157Idah0795,798(CkhApp.2014)
The precedent

cited

by

the State

0n

referenced cases, a party submitted a motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), but
all intents

and purposes” an invocation of the grounds

different deadline. See

Eden

v.

State (In re

In one of the

this subj ect is readily distinguishable.

its

in I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1),

argument was “for

Which

SRBA Case N0. 395 76 Subase N0.

carries a

37-00864), 164

Idaho 241, 252 (2018). Consequently, the party’s strategy was defeated by the settled rule that
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

and I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) are “mutually exclusive provisions.”

Id.

That rule has no

bearing here. Mr. Pizzuto’s motion was properly advanced under Rule 60(b)(6) given

Nor has

the Court ever indicated that Rule 60(b)(6)

“mutually exclusive.” In
like

at

any other

734—38.

fact, the

civil matter,

its

timing.

and post-conviction proceedings are

Court has stated the opposite: that a post-conviction action,

can be reopened through a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. See Eby, 148 Idaho

The

even further aﬁeld.

State’s other caselaw is

It

ﬂows from the more

the provision to apply to a motion to reopen depends, in part,

Ross

v.

State, 141

Idaho 670, 671—72

(Ct.

App. 2005). The

0n when

was submitted. See

rules themselves

See I.R.C.P. 59(6) (requiring submission of a motion to

clear.

it

alter or

basic idea that

make

as

much

amend judgment Within

fourteen days); I.R.C.P. 60(c)(1) (six months for certain kinds of motions for relief from

judgment).

N0

such rules pertain here. That

60(b)(6) motion can only be ﬁled Within

regarded as a

is,

there

is

not an authority Which provides: a Rule

X number of days and after that any pleading is rightly

new post-conviction petition.

Rather, a Rule 60(b)(6) motion must simply be ﬁled

Within a reasonable time of the triggering event, and Mr. Pizzuto’s was.

Turning t0 the substance 0f the timeliness question, the State

upon

Pizzuto’s current theory so as t0 force

it

as a triggering event the U.S.

decision in Hall rather than the Ninth Circuit’s 2019 opinion in his

18—20.

T0 accomplish that

claim

that this Court’s

is

sleight

Pizzuto’s claim. Instead, his position

failed to

is

comply With Hall. See

that this Court’s

scientiﬁc standards existing at the time and With Atkins

AOB at 6—8.
because
this

it

It

own

0f Mr.

Supreme Court’s

case.

See Ans. Br.

at

0f hand, the State repeatedly suggests that Mr. Pizzuto’s

2008 opinion

had already been 0n the books

distorts the nature

for six years

here.

2008 opinion was

v.

Virginia,

But
at

that is not

Mr.

odds with the

536 U.S. 304 (2002), Which

and mandated the acceptance 0f such standards. See

would hardly have made sense

had already been rejected

id.

See

to articulate that position in the

id.

It

was only When

wake of Hall,

the Ninth Circuit agreed that

Court strayed from the scientiﬁc standards that Mr. Pizzuto had an opportunity to reactivate

his post-conviction case.

The

State expresses confusion about this distinction. In particular, the State struggles to

apprehend what would be alleged in a post-conviction petition triggered by Hall, as opposed

What was alleged

in the

Rule 60(b) motion that was triggered by the Ninth Circuit opinion and

which Mr. Pizzuto ﬁled. See Ans.

would have
the law

on

stated that

Br. at 19. Mr. Pizzuto Will accordingly clarify.

and Mr. Pizzuto’s death sentence satisﬁed the new

Rule 60(b) motion averred

that the

Pizzuto’s challenge t0 the death sentence

utilize

was

Ninth Circuit opinion reﬂected

right all along,

and

AOB

because

was

Why Rule

60(b)

Circuit opinion, the State

comments

that the

at 6—8.

That

The

State’s allusion is

McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 415—16 (2017), Where the issue was what role the Ninth

Circuit’s Fourth

Amendment precedent ought t0 play

seizure law. There

in

how Mr.

Court did in fact

this

decisions 0f lower federal courts are not binding here. See Ans. Br. at 20.

v.

By

Why the motion was timely.

Downplaying the signiﬁcance of the Ninth

t0 State

test.

is

an unscientiﬁc model in denying his claim. See

the correct vehicle

The former

Mr. Pizzuto’s death sentence was unconstitutional because Hall changed

intellectual disability,

contrast, the

to

Mr. Pizzuto

’s

is

n0 similar issue

in the case at bar.

The Ninth

0n search-and-

Circuit opinion

was rendered

very case, by a court With competent jurisdiction, and on the same ﬁmdamental

constitutional question that

Amendment due

in Idaho jurisprudence

is

presented here: Whether the death sentence

t0 the inmate’s intellectual disability.

are of limited value

See

AOB

at

is

void under the Eighth

11—12. McNeely and the like

now.

Setting that distinction to one side, the State

is

also

wrong

t0 suggest that there is

requirement that the Ninth Circuit opinion be “binding” in order for

it

t0 trigger a valid

any

Rule

60(b)(6) motion. Rule 60(b)(6)

circumstances.” Miller

v.

was designed

Haws, 861 F.3d 977, 987—88

is

not technically precedential. For example, in Hall

fact that his co-defendant received relief from the

0n the same claim. Mr. Hall was permitted
granting relief to his co-defendant

1.

v.

(9th Cir. 2017), a habeas petitioner successfully reopened his case

under Rule 60(b)(6) based on the

993 n.1

accommodate “unique and compelling

Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 349 (1996). Such circumstances can be

presented by a judicial opinion that

at

t0

t0 reactivate his case

was unpublished and

Ninth Circuit

even though the opinion

thus “not binding”

on the Hall

court. Id.

That was because, regardless 0f the precedential status 0f the earlier opinion, Mr.

Hall showed “extraordinary circumstances” in Which the denial 0f the Rule 60(b) motion would

have led t0 a “manifest

injustice.” Id. at

987—88. The same

is

true here,

where the Ninth Circuit

opinion revealed the unscientiﬁc nature of this Court’s 2008 opinion and where Mr. Pizzuto will

be executed in the absence of Rule 60(b) intervention.

The

State opines that

it

was only

in

Hall that the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the

clinical standards for intellectual disability, not in Atkins.

See Ans. Br.

at

20—23.

From that

foundation, the State infers that the current claim should have been raised again in the
Hall, and not in a Rule 60(b) motion after the Ninth Circuit ruled. See

defective.

the

most

While

selectively cherry-picking quotations

instructive,

What the Supreme Court could have meant by
a part of Eighth

Amendment law

in 2008,

The foundation

from the two opinions, the

where the Hall Court described the

case—as a “fundamental premise ofAtkins.” 572 U.S.

id.

The

State

is

when Mr.

Pizzuto’s appeal

was

core of this

completely

this line if not that clinical standards

denied.

is

State ignores

SEM—the very norm at the

at 720.

wake 0f

silent

0n

were already

Similarly, While the Attorney General places great stress

states

some leeway

in setting

see Ans. Br. at 21—22,

it

up procedures

for the adjudication

misses the fact that Hall

on the

fact that Atkins

gave the

of intellectual-disability claims,

itself has clearly

announced

that such

leeway

did not include the power t0 establish the kind of bright-line IQ cutoff that this Court did in

2008. Speciﬁcally, Hall noted the very language underscored by the State here and then
nevertheless cautioned that “Atkins did not give the States unfettered discretion t0 deﬁne the ﬁlll

scope 0f the constitutional protection.” 572 U.S.

summarize Atkins’ discussion of the
“fundamental premise”

line

clinical standards, a

quoted above. See

t0 clarify that Atkins did in fact

at 719.

approve 0f at

understanding of intellectual disability,

id. at

least

After

summary

that included the

719—20. The plain import of this passage

some

is

The

Atkins, and faults

the

Opening

him

is

2020

AOB at 7—8, Smith v.

WL 3578740 (2020),

Supreme Court

is

directly

State’s blinders, Smith

is

opinion.

He

did.

As

outlined in

cert.

denied,

on point. The Tenth Circuit wrote there

in Atkins accepted clinical deﬁnitions for the

under the existing

own

Sharp, 935 F.3d 1064 (10th Cir. 2019),

clinical definitions,” including the

a well-reasoned opinion that

is

SEM.

that

meaning of the term mentally

retarded,” and that “Atkins clearly establishes that intellectual disability

in part,

interpreting the case in a

“unaware” 0f any cases adopting Mr. Pizzuto’s interpretation of

for not providing such citations. Ans. Br. at 23.

Brief, see

--- S. Ct. ----,

“[t]he

SEM in particular. By

and—most signiﬁcantly—of the

squarely at odds With the U.S. Supreme Court’s reading of its
State purports to be

is

aspects of the medical community’s

harping 0n Atkins’ nod to state-court discretion, the Attorney General

way that

Court went on to

that, the

must be assessed,

Id. at

at least

1077. Despite the

obviously germane here. The Alabama

Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted a similar perspective 0n Hall as well. See Reeves
State,

226 So. 3d 71 1, 727 n.7

App. 2016) (“We View Hall, not as a new rule of

(Ala. Crim.

constitutional law, but simply as an application 0f existing law,

facts.”).

v.

i.e.,

Atkins, to a speciﬁc set of

These decisions are thoughtful and persuasive. They should be followed, and the Rule

60(b) motion should be considered timely.

IV.

On the merits,

The Rule 60(b) Motion Was Meritorious

there are

of the Ninth Circuit opinion:

two bases

for retracting the previously entered judgment in light

(1) the opinion erodes the legal

2008 decision denying Mr. Pizzuto’s Atkins claim; and
negligence and

its

and scientiﬁc bases for

(2) the opinion

this

Court’s

exposes prior counsel’s

consequences. The State counters both bases, and Mr. Pizzuto takes them in

turn.

A.

The Ninth

Circuit Opinion

Was A Valid

Triggering Event

Turning t0 the ﬁrst 0f the two, the State seems t0 hint
short 0f the Rule 60(b) standard because

T0 Mr.

Mr. Pizzuto

falls

n0 Idaho case has previously invoked the provision

under similar circumstances. See Ans. Br.
arisen before.

at the outset that

at 26.

But

that is only

because the situation has never

Pizzuto’s knowledge, n0 Idaho inmate has ever sought to reopen a post-

conviction proceeding after a declaration by the federal judiciary 0n habeas review that the state
courts misapplied the science in effect at the time.

The

State’s assumptions notwithstanding, an

absence 0f precedent does not constitute a prohibition. “Rule 60(b)(6)
equitable

power

to

d0 justice

F.2d 1453, 1458 (5th

in a particular case.” Harrell

Cir. 1992).

v.

is

DCS Equip.

“The broad language of clause

a grand reservoir of

Leasing Corp, 951

(6) gives the courts

ample

power

to vacate

judgments Whenever such action

is

appropriate to accomplish justice.” Id. Such

a ﬂexible rule can be employed in a variety 0f novel scenarios, no matter whether they happen to

have occurred before. Indeed, Rule 60(b)(6) was created precisely for “unique and compelling
circumstances.” Miller, 129 Idaho at 349.
prior precedent

when

its

very purpose

is

It

would be perverse

to cover

unique

t0 rigidly restrict a rule

based 0n

situations.

Next, the State submits that because the Ninth Circuit did not criticize this Court’s
analysis 0f prong three—onset before age eighteen—its opinion

27.

It is

is

meaningless. See Ans. Br. at

important t0 remember, though, that the Ninth Circuit’s exploration 0f the issue was

conﬁned

t0 the record created in state court.

2019) (per curiam) (“Because

[the

See Pizzuto

v.

Yardy, 947 F.3d 5 10, 523 (9th Cir.

Idaho Supreme Court] denied Pizzuto’s Atkins claim on the

merits, our review under § 2254(d) is limited to the record that

was before

the state court”).

That record was undeveloped, as n0 evidentiary hearing was ever conducted in
further testing administered.

When the Ninth Circuit deemed the

ﬁndings not obj ectively unreasonable,
Pizzuto’s

own

experts had “requested

it

state court

and n0

Idaho Supreme Court’s

did so With reference to the fact that one of Mr.

more

testing” because “those with persistent seizure

disorders, like Pizzuto, tend t0 decline in their mental abilities over time.” Id. at 532.

As

elaborated in the Opening Brief and in the next section 0f this reply, the case needs t0 be
reactivated in part because the Ninth Circuit opinion reveals the negligence of prior counsel in

her half—hearted pursuit 0f additional testing. See

The

testing has since

been done, and

it

led

AOB

two experts

at

16—21; see also infra

t0 opine that

intellectually disabled before his eighteenth birthday, as required

10

by

at Part

IV.B.

Mr. Pizzuto was
the Idaho statute and the

Constitution, while a third expert concluded that he suffered

before he attained the age of eighteen. See

AOB at 22—28.

from numerous adaptive deﬁcits

In overview, the inadequacy of the

record on the third prong was a product 0f the very deﬁciencies in prior counsel’s performance
that militate in favor

which counsels

of reopening the case. The gap has since been ﬁlled With

new

evidence

for an evidentiary hearing.

Prior counsel’s mishandling of the case

warped

this Court’s

2008 analysis 0f the

third

prong in another respect. In the original Atkins proceedings, Dr. Craig Beaver explicitly swore in
an afﬁdavit that Mr. Pizzuto likely met the standard for
statute,

intellectual disability

under the Idaho

see Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 730, and the statute itself deﬁnes intellectual disability With

reference t0 onset before one’s eighteenth birthday, see

id. at

728. Nevertheless, the Court

declined to address the possibility that Dr. Beaver’s afﬁdavit thereby provided prima facie

evidence that the third prong was satisﬁed—and thus an evidentiary hearing in order—because,
in

its

View, prior counsel never

made such an argument. See

id. at

730—3 1. Of course, prior

counsel’s miscues are one 0f the chief factors meriting a reopening 0f the case, so this feature of
the case only strengthens Mr. Pizzuto’s position?

2

Even

apart

from counsel’s omissions

in that regard,

it

was improper

hearing solely because of a perceived absence of expert testimony

for the Court to

when there was

deny a

extensive

documentary evidence in the record from lay Witnesses about Mr. Pizzuto’s cognitive difﬁculties
as a youth. See 32679 R. 279, EX. 7, at 16—33 & attachments cited therein. Since his case was
the ﬁrst one dealing with Idaho’s capital intellectual-disability statute, Mr. Pizzuto had n0
guidance from the courts 0n exactly What type 0f allegations were necessary to secure a hearing,
Which is another reason to remand for such a hearing now.

11

The Court’s other motivation
that

for side-stepping Dr. Beaver’s afﬁdavit

he “was talking about Pizzuto’s present condition, not his condition

73 1. That ﬁnding was just as unscientiﬁc as the

To

was

statute

is

been—by deﬁnition

eighteen. See, e.g., Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3

even conceive 0f something
terms. See Pizzuto

v.

deﬁnes

Mr.

true not just as a matter 0f Idaho law, but as an elemental

a status that only exists if the patient had

Cir. 2019), cert. pet.

Id. at

opine, as Dr. Beaver did, that the

principle of psychology. In every reputable medical source, intellectual disability

633 (8th

impression

likely satisﬁed is automatically t0 opine that the condition appeared before

Pizzuto’s eighteenth birthday. That

has

its

age eighteen.”

SEM discussion. As noted, the

intellectual disability as requiring pre-eighteen onset.

statute

at

was

ﬁled (19-7862)

& 318;

it

by

United States

(Feb. 28, 2020).

N0

the time he turned

Coonce, 932 F.3d 623,

v.

medical professional would

like “adult-onset” intellectual disability, for

Blades, N0. 1:05-cv-516, 2012

is—and long

WL 73236, at *11

it is

a contradiction in

(D. Idaho Jan. 10, 2012)

(agreeing “with Pizzuto that the state court’s focus on distinguishing between childhood and
adult—onset” intellectual disability

deﬁnition, a condition that

F.3d 1178 (9th

Cir.

is

“makes

little

sense” because intellectual disability

is,

“by

manifested before the age of 18”), vacated 0n other grounds, 758

2014) (per curiam). This Court assumed that Dr. Beaver was speaking in

terms that were, from a medical perspective, oxymoronic, which

is

yet another unscientiﬁc

aspect of the opinion and therefore an additional reason to reopen the case.

For the most
scientiﬁcally valid,

comes

part, the State

does not even try to defend

n0 doubt because 0f how difﬁcult a job

to such a defense is to highlight

how the

this Court’s

that

would

be.

2008 opinion

The

as

closest the State

U.S. Supreme Court characterized Idaho’s

12

See Ans. Br.

intellectual-disability test in Hall.

at 24, 27.3 In particular, the State

notes that Hall

described Idaho as allowing a petitioner t0 offer more evidence 0f intellectual disability even

When his IQ
in

Which

this

score

was higher than

id.

Hall had in mind the passage from Pizzuto

Court remarked that from the reported score of seventy-two the

just as easily infer an “actual

at

seventy. See

IQ” of seventy-seven as

717 (quoting Pizzuto, 146 Idaho

at 729).

it

district

judge could

could of sixty-seven. See Hall, 572 U.S.

That passage from Pizzuto was one of the very

scientiﬁc errors giving rise to the instant case.

As

detailed

by the Ninth

Circuit, the clinical

standards in 2008 required a consideration 0f adaptive deﬁcits in an intellectual-disability

evaluation if an individual had an

IQ score between seventy and seventy-ﬁve. See Pizzuto, 947

This Court did not engage in that consideration.

at 526.

It

instead concluded that the district

court could just pick either sixty-seven rather than seventy-seven—apparently at

end

its

random—and

inquiry there. In other words, this Court authorized a district judge With a seventy-two

in front

of him t0 deny a petition with the sole justiﬁcation that he was opting t0 draw the

inference that the inmate’s “actual IQ”

was not

IQ

intellectually disabled.

That

is

was seventy-seven, and consequently
emblematic 0f the scientiﬁc error

that the prisoner

at the heart

of the case,

and neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor any credible medical organization has ever approved of
it.

3

on the timeliness 0f the Rule 60(b) motion,
see Ans. Br. at 24, and its section 0n the merits, see id. at 27. In Mr. Pizzuto’s judgment, the
issue goes more to the merits, but t0 the extent it applies to timeliness the argument above should
also be considered in that light.
This point of the State’s appears in both

its

section

13

Moreover, even ifHall’s passing reference t0 the Idaho
State’s argument,

it

somehow

supports the

cannot change the signiﬁcance of the 2008 Pizzuto opinion. Although the

U.S. Supreme Court
judiciaries that

statute

is

of course the ﬁnal arbiter 0f the Eighth Amendment,

have the ultimate authority

to

deﬁne

their

own

it is

the state

statutes. See, e.g.,

Gurley

v.

Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 208 (1975). Hall’s brief mention of Idaho in the course of a ﬁfty-state
survey cannot change the nature of What this Court held in Pizzuto.
held was that a

district

judge

petitioner with a seventy-two

is

And What it unequivocally

permitted t0 rebuff an intellectual-disability claim brought by a

IQ without hearing evidence 0f adaptive

deﬁcits. That

was

inconsistent With the prevailing medical standards at the time, and the case should accordingly be

reopened.
Left with so

by belaboring
Ans. Br.

at

little

to grasp at

0n the substance, the

the unremarkable notion that

28—29. The hole in the State’s argument

before the Court. Mr. Pizzuto
in Atkins. This

is

law are non-retroactive. See

that there is

n0 question of retroactivity

Court has acknowledged that—as a federal constitutional matter—Atkins “must

own post-conviction proceeding.

vacatur 0f his death sentence in this case if he

is

begins

Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at

Stated differently, the Court has already determined that Mr. Pizzuto has a right t0

11.4.

today

is

in the

It

attempting t0 reactivate a post-conviction matter that was rooted

be applied retroactively” in Mr. Pizzuto’s

728

some changes

State resorts to retroactivity.

the

same

as

it

was

in 2008: is

is

intellectually disabled.

Mr. Pizzuto

plainly deserving of relief if that question

is

The question

intellectually disabled? Since

answered afﬁrmatively, retroactivity

nor there.

14

in the case

Mr. Pizzuto
is

is

neither here

Why the

Another way of seeing

State’s retroactivity defense

those cases where such a defense does pose a problem.

conviction petition,

were 0n

The

it is

direct appeal 0r

State’s

own

cited

still

a red herring

When retroactivity is

is to

consider

a bar to a post-

because the type of claim only inures t0 the beneﬁt of defendants

even

earlier in the process at the

example

Who

time the law changed in their favor.

a perfect illustration. See Schriro

is

351 (2004) (“When a decision of this Court results in a
cases

is

new rule,

v.

Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,

that rule applies t0 all criminal

pending 0n direct review. As to convictions that are already ﬁnal, however, the rule

applies only in limited circumstances.”).4

As mentioned,

this

Court settled in 2008 that Mr.

Pizzuto can claim the beneﬁt of the relevant change in the law,
intellectually disabled

from

was ever an

the protection of the

even though his conviction was ﬁnal

capital punishment,

ofAtkins. Insofar as retroactivity

i.e.,

obstacle t0 Mr. Pizzuto’s claim,

it

at the

time

has been

deﬁnitively removed.

The

State unpersuasively enlists in

curiam). In Shoop, the U.S.

Circuit

opinion from the state judiciary.

is

cause Shoop

entirely a product

that

Id. at

was not

506.

The

The

Hill,

139

S. Ct.

504 (2019) (per

ofAtkz'ns relief because the Sixth

“clearly established at the time” 0f the pertinent

“clearly established” test motivating the

of the federal habeas

statute,

mentioned seventeen times in an eight-page opinion. See

4

v.

Supreme Court reversed a grant

below drew upon precedent

decision

its

28 U.S.C.
id. at

§

Shoop

2254, Which the Court

505—09. That statute instructs

Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (201 1), see Ans. Br. at 29, is even
farther off the mark. Davis dealt With a line 0f cases that are all about Whether police acted in
“good faith” compliance With then-binding law, 564 U.S. at 245, Which has nothing t0 do with
State’s reference to

the present proceeding.

15

federal judges

0n how

deference. See,

0n the

e.g.,

to

review the decisions of their

Wilson

v.

Sellers,

1188, 1191—92 (2018). Section 2254(d)

S. Ct.

Cf Long v. Johnson, 736 F.3d

might have granted

relief if it

891, 897 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that the panel

were reviewing the case

as a state court, but that

because 0f the restrictions 0n federal habeas proceedings imposed by
B.

Prior Counsel’s Negligence

not

is

and Shoop’s construction 0f it does not cut against Mr.

table in this state-court matter

Pizzuto’s motion.

138

with the proper level of

state peers

§

it

could not

2254).

Was A Valid Triggering Event

Mr. Pizzuto’s second ground for reactivating the case ﬂows from the serious missteps

made by

his prior attorney in the initial Atkins post-conviction proceedings, a type

of Rule 60(b)

theory that has been expressly approved 0f by this Court. See Eby, 148 Idaho at 734—38.
detailed below, those missteps induced the Ninth Circuit to later

deny him habeas

As

dire repercussion imaginable. In countering this ground, the State blunders, preliminarily,

misconstruing the governing standard of law.

T0

seminal case of Eby and

Court made
“neglect

it

it is

true that

at 34.

The

When

she engaged in “years 0f

State pulls that language

Eby involved such

conduct.

Still, it is

necessary for relief in every case. The question posed by

by post-conviction

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)

may be

relief counsel”

by

the State’s mind, Rule 60(b) only supplies a

vehicle for contesting a post-conviction attorney’s performance

shocking and disgraceful neglect.” Ans. Br.

most

relief, the

from the

not true that the

Eby was Whether

can constitute “grounds upon which relief under

granted[.]” Id. at 736.

Eby

holding 0f the case.

16

said yes, see

id. at

736—38, and that

is

the

When Eby is Viewed in context,

Mr. Pizzuto easily qualiﬁes for

relief under

it.

In

lobbying for the inverse conclusion, the State unsurprisingly zeroes in 0n the tasks that prior
counsel here did accomplish. See Ans. Br. at 34—35. Nonetheless, because the issue
counsel did t0 secure testing, the proper inquiry
that goal.

With the question framed

thusly, the

is

into

What tasks she accomplished

answer becomes

Counsel ﬁled a motion for testing and then did not notice

any other fashion. The watchword of Eby
six times.

148 Idaho

at

counsel’s performance

is

“inactivity,” a

what

to further

plain: effectively nothing.

for hearing or apparently pursue

it

in

term the opinion uses n0 fewer than

732—34. In regards t0 the issue of testing—the only issue that matters—

was

the epitome of inactivity.

Later, the State unsuccessfully attempts t0

Mr. Pizzuto’s case,

it

is

insisting that the

draw another categorical

former only applies to an

initial

line

between Eby and

post-conviction petition and

not subsequent ones. See Ans. Br. at 36—37. For support, the State looks t0 Parvin and Lopez,

though they are not 0n point. Those decisions were both written
litigants that,

When they

at 798.

In issuing

inform post-conviction

are dissatisﬁed with the services of their attorneys, their only

seek Rule 60(b) relief rather than ﬁle a

Idaho

to

its

new petition. See Parvin, 157 Idaho

directives in Parvin

at

venue

is t0

521; Lopez, 157

and Lopez, the Court of Appeals alluded

t0 initial

post-conviction proceedings because those were the proceedings in Which counsel happened t0

have taken the actions the petitioners were unhappy with, so those were the proceedings in which
the I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion

Idaho

at 796.

That the

had

initial

t0

be submitted. See Parvin, 157 Idaho

at

518—20; Lopez, 157

post—conviction proceedings were the pertinent ones in Parvin and

Lopez as a matter of happenstance does not mean

17

that they

always

are.

No

Idaho appellate court

has ever purported t0 limit
“neglect

may be
as

it

Eby

by post-conviction

granted[.]”

relief counsel” is

148 Idaho

By

at 736.

does t0 ﬁrst petitions, and there

Even

As observed

in that fashion.

is

if the State’s distinction

its

earlier, the

holding of Eby

that

is

“grounds upon which relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)
plain terms, that applies t0 second petitions as

n0 basis

much

for the Court to hold otherwise.

were sound,

it

would not

cut against Mr. Pizzuto’s motion.

Granted, the petition at issue in these proceedings might be labeled “successive” as a shorthand
to reﬂect that there

in

any sense

that

were others

that

preceded

Be

it.

that as

may, the petition

it

would deprive Mr. Pizzuto 0f his Rule 60(b)

rights,

not successive

is

even under the State’s

warped reading of Eby. The U.S. Supreme Court ﬁrst declared the execution of the
disabled t0 be unconstitutional in Atkins, Which

was decided

in 2002.

See Pizzuto, 146 Idaho

723. Mr. Pizzuto’s Atkins petition, which initiated the instant proceeding,

following year and was
ﬁrst one ﬁled

sentence. See

deemed timely by this

by Mr. Pizzuto
id. at

Court. See

id. at

intellectually

was submitted

at

the

726—27. That petition was the

alleging intellectual disability as a ground for vacating his death

722—24. Consequently,

post-conviction proceeding, at least as

it

this case is

most accurately conceived 0f as aﬁrst

concerns the Atkins issue. See Panetti

v.

Quarterman,

551 U.S. 930, 942—47 (2007) (concluding that a second habeas petition raising a newly ripened
claim was not successive Within the meaning of federal habeas law). If there were some rule that

Eby has no bearing on second petitions,
petitioner could

it

would presumably be on

have raised the claim in his ﬁrst

petition.

asserted the claim in his earlier petitions, as Atkins

the reasoning that the

But Mr. Pizzuto could not have

had not yet been

issued.

The

State writes off

Panetti as a non-binding case, see Ans. Br. at 37, without offering any reasoning as to

18

why

its

straightforward logic should not apply here 0r

differently

Why Mr.

Pizzuto’s Atkins issue should be treated

from any other timely post-conviction claim.
championing of prior counsel ﬂows from

Partly, the State’s

of her reasoning

is

currently at issue.

The

its

State posits that the Idaho

confusion over Which part

Supreme Court “did not

consider [her] arguments to be far-fetched or even without merit, either with respect to the

automatic or cause motions for disqualiﬁcation.” Ans. Br.
prior counsel’s arguments about

as those

were the arguments

this

made

not the theory that

Why Judge

at 37.

It

seems the State has

Court took up. See Pizzuto, 146 Idaho

prior counsel’s approach defective.

at

724—26. However,

was, instead, the theory

is

that

any order Judge Reinhardt rendered 0n the motion for testing would be

t0 notice her

was

in play.

For

motion for hearing, and

60(b) proceedings.

it is

it is

that latter theory that

that decision that

And 0n that theory, Which Mr.

exceedingly tenuous, see

AOB

at

mind

Reinhardt should have been removed from the case,

that

disqualiﬁcation issue

in

16—18, the State

It

illegitimate While the

animated counsel’s decision not

Mr. Pizzuto targets in these Rule

Pizzuto has revealed in detail to be

is

notably

silent.

As

a consequence, the State

supplies n0 basis for the Court to absolve prior counsel of her miscues.

The

State touts prior counsel’s gambit as a creative ploy that

in line with the professional guidelines for capital defense lawyers.

showed her aggressiveness,
See Ans. Br.

at 37.

There

no doubt

that capital defense attorneys

even

has not yet been embraced by controlling precedent. That said, they do not thereby

if it

have a responsibility

t0

is

push any colorable argument,

gain a license toforfeit the more promising, more conventional arguments that might beneﬁt
their clients.

To

the contrary, the purpose of inventive, comprehensive litigation

19

is

to preserve as

many potentially meritorious
the

issues as possible. See

American Bar Association: Guidelines

Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel

in

Death Penalty Cases, reprinted

at

for

31

Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 1030 (2003) (“One of the most fundamental duties 0f an attorney defending
a capital case at

trial is

the preservation 0f any and

all

conceivable errors for each stage of

appellate and post—conviction review”); see also Martinez

(“Effective

easily

trial

v.

Ryan, 566 U.S.

1,

12 (2012)

counsel preserves claims to be considered 0n appeal.”). Prior counsel could

have preserved her

ability to

make

the unorthodox argument about Judge Reinhardt

lacking authority t0 rule 0n her motion while likewise preserving the far
t0 argue t0 ﬁxture courts that she

had exhaustively developed the

was make

claim. A11 she needed to do

more important

ability

facts supporting her Atkins

the second argument in the alternative to the ﬁrst,

something lawyers d0 every day in courts around the country. See,

e.g.,

State

v.

Abdullah, 158

Idaho 386, 482 (2015) (mentioning that counsel for a capital post-conviction petitioner made an

argument in the
so,

alternative); State

Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 558 (2008) (same). She failed t0 d0

and her negligence warrants Rule 60(b)
V.

As

recited in the

evidentiary hearing

See

v.

AOB

at

is

An Evidentiary Hearing Is Appropriate

Opening

Brief,

21—30. Looking for a

been adjudicated

once the case

mandated pursuant

the State professes that

it is

relief.

way to

is

reopened under Rule 60(b), an

t0 both Idaho post—conviction

free itself from the

law and the Constitution.

burden 0f this mandatory hearing,

barred by res judicata because the same issue has supposedly already

in federal court.

See Ans. Br.

at

posture of the case and the nature 0f res judicata.

20

38—42. The State misapprehends both the

Before taking up those points, Mr. Pizzuto pauses t0 correct the State’s misapprehension
about the relevant body of evidence that demands a hearing.
Pizzuto’s

District

6‘

only justiﬁcation” for a hearing

is

It is

the State’s impression that Mr.

Court during the original Atkins post—conviction proceedings.

clearly outlined in his

Opening

Brief,

County

the evidence brought forward in Idaho

Id. at 38.

Mr. Pizzuto’s request for a hearing

is

Not

so.

As

bolstered both

by

the

evidence adduced earlier and by material that has never before been considered in state court.

See

AOB

at 21.

The same confusion 0n

the State’s part leads

it

Mr. Pizzuto for

to criticize

insufﬁciently explaining the signiﬁcance 0f the earlier evidence. See Ans. Br. at 38.

signiﬁcance

Opening

is

the

Brief, all

same

it,

new material:

as set forth at length in the

of it supports a ﬁnding that Mr. Pizzuto has made a prima facie case 0f

intellectual disability

imagines

as the signiﬁcance 0f the

Its

and

is

entitled to a hearing.

a brieﬁng deﬁciency.

See

AOB at 21—29.

The purpose of brieﬁng

is

This

is not,

as the State

t0 identify the facts supporting

one’s legal theory, which Mr. Pizzuto amply did.

As

for claim preclusion, the Court

because the doctrine

is

need not delve into the individual res judicata

completely irreconcilable with the unusual facts presented here.

factors,

As

the

State correctly remarks, the foremost purpose of res judicata is t0 “preserve[] the acceptability 0f

judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that

were twice

litigated t0 inconsistent results.”

Ans. Br.

at

39 (quoting Ticor

144 Idaho 119, 123 (2007)). The “disrespect” that res judicata
the original court that ﬁrst rendered a decision

would follow

is

meant

if the

same matter

Title C0.

v.

Stanion,

t0 discourage is

0n the matter. See Crown

v.

towards

Klein Bros., 121

Idaho 942, 949 (Ct. App. 1991) (applying res judicata because the challenged “litigation could
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lead to a judgment that
Parisian, Ina, 27 F.

is

inconsistent With” an earlier court order); see also Quincy

App’x 63 1, 640

the earlier decision that res judicata

judgment 0f the federal
explicitly clariﬁes that

courts.

it

it

v.

(7th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (similar). In the case at hand,

would

from disrespect would of course be the

shield

Yet the decisive opinion from the federal judiciary on the matter

“does not preclude the Idaho courts from reconsidering” Mr. Pizzuto’s

intellectual disability. Pizzuto,

that

Mall

947 F.3d

at 534.

In effect, the State

must stay away from an issue out 0f deference

is

asking the Court t0 hold

t0 the federal judiciary

When the

federal

judiciary itself has invited the Court to address that very issue. That turns the entire philosophy

0f res judicata on

its

head.

Should the Court nevertheless proceed

t0 the speciﬁc res judicata criteria, they

d0 not

support a different outcome. Whether Viewed in terms 0f issue preclusion 0r claim preclusion,
res judicata is only present

& sources cited therein.

When there was

a ﬁnal judgment in the prior case. See Ans. Br. at 39

Here, there was not.

A judgment becomes ﬁnal for res judicata purposes in Idaho When the losing party has
exhausted—or has had an opportunity

t0

exhaust—his appellate remedies. See Smith

v.

Smith,

164 Idaho 46, 51 (2018). In jurisdictions taking that approach, a federal order acquires n0 res
judicata

for

power until

certiorari

commencing them has

proceedings have concluded

passed. See Silver

v.

at the

U.S. Supreme Court or the time

Queen ’s Hosp, 629 P.2d 1116, 1124 (Haw.

1981)
Mr. Pizzuto’s federal appeal remains pending. His petition for

May 28, 2020

and the State has not yet submitted
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its

certiorari

brief in opposition. See

was ﬁled 0n

https://www. supremecourt. gov/search.aspx?ﬁlename=/d0cket/docketﬁles/html/public/ 1 98598.htm1.

As

See Ans. Br.

a result, the Court will not rule 0n the petition until October 2020 at the earliest.

at 42.

does not attach to

The

Until

it

does, the federal district court’s order

is

not ﬁnal, and res judicata

it.

State perceives the foregoing

method

the State does not take issue with the proposition that, in Idaho, a judgment

it is

difﬁcult to see

not exist, as the State wishes.
irrelevant if Idaho

how the

is

Nor does

the State

expound 0n why

City ofSeattle, 375 P.2d 256,

Furthermore, by training
sight

not ﬁnal as a

is

until

certiorari

proceedings are

any appeals are over. Contrary t0

not just the rule in Hawaii, but in any jurisdiction that

acknowledges—like Idaho—the role 0f appellate
v.

Still,

Court could simply pretend the certiorari proceedings do

law regards a judgment as non—ﬁnal

the State’s assertion, that

is

id.

And once that proposition

matter of res judicata until appellate litigation has concluded.
accepted,

See

as inconsistent With Idaho law.

litigation in a res judicata inquiry.

See Beezer

257 (Wash. 1962) (en banc) (per curiam).
its

attention

of the operative opinion. For the

on the

federal district court’s order, the State loses

district court’s

order has

now been

superseded by the

Ninth Circuit’s opinion, Which has become the authoritative statement 0n Mr. Pizzuto’s habeas
case from the federal judiciary.

that

it

was “not address[ing]”

And in that authoritative

statement, the Ninth Circuit stressed

the question presented here,

disabled” or “Whether his execution

would

i.e.,

Violate the Eighth

habeas statute precluded any review of it. Pizzuto, 947 F.3d
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“whether Pizzuto

is intellectually

Amendment,” because

at 515.

the federal

In that regard, the issue

under review

now

is

not the issue that

was resolved

in federal court, as required

since the ruling that answered the question has been supplanted

It is

See Ans. Br.

under

§

made

after its evidentiary hearing, as

The Ninth

at 26, 30.

F.3d 778, 822 (9th

State

v.

does throughout the Answering

§

categorically forbidden. See, e.g.,

status, those

State’s chief authority

Creech, 132 Idaho

1

on how

Circuit’s opinion in

its

by

res judicata.

Cir. 1991).

case.

As

Nor was

See Arave

v.

is

the

most signiﬁcant

that

grew out of it.

nullity.

Most

v.

setting—

importantly, the federal

issue potentially barred

Arave, 947 F.2d 873 (9th

factor cutting against res judicata in this

there any question in Creech about the ﬁnality of the federal judgment. In that

case, the federal proceedings concluded in

March 1993 with the U.S. Supreme Court’s

See Creech, 507 U.S. 463. The issues that were
in April 1994.

Schriro, 882

two features 0f the present

on the very

Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993); Creech

discussed, that

v.

Mr. Pizzuto’s appeal, then,

cause. For the

for further state proceedings

an

relief,

res judicata operates in the post-conviction

(1998)—does not help

had not called

was “barred

Murray

ﬁndings have become a legal

case that render res judicata irrelevant here were both absent there.
courts in Creech

it

2254(d) forecloses habeas

below should never have occurred, nor the ﬁndings

Far from enj oying res judicata

The

When

Under the Ninth

Cir. 2018).

the evidentiary hearing

is

0n the ﬁndings the

Circuit denied habeas relief because

2254(d).” Pizzuto, 947 F.3d at 515.

evidentiary hearing in federal court

it

res judicata,

ruling that did not.

especially inappropriate for the State t0 rely for res judicata

federal district court

Brief.

by a

by

See Creech, 132 Idaho

at 6.

later

Unlike
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decision.

found barred by res judicata began arising

this case, there

was n0 argument

t0

be made

in

Creech

that the federal

judgment With supposedly

The Creech decision did not address
Stepping back a

bit,

the

res judicata effect

the argument, or foreclose

more general theme 0f the

hearing has already happened in federal habeas, so one

law backwards.

It is

is

was afﬁrmed

in post—conviction

Will be pursuant t0 a death warrant issued

by an Idaho

v.

Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (201

It

courts. If Mr. Pizzuto is executed,

The Idaho

court.

unconstitutionally. See Zwickler

v.

moment he was

happened

by

it

courts have been deeply

charged. Having been so

is

not carried out

Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) (“[S]tate courts also have

the solemn responsibility, equally With the federal courts,

right granted or secured

1).

was upheld 0n appeal by an

involved, they have a responsibility to ensure that the death sentence

its

dispositive here.

unnecessary here. The State gets the

court.

by Idaho

involved in Mr. Pizzuto’s death sentence from the

abdicate

it is

well-established that “state courts are the principal forum for asserting

Mr. Pizzuto’s death sentence was imposed by an Idaho
It

and

State’s appeal t0 res judicata is that a

constitutional challenges to state convictions.” Harrington

Idaho court.

it,

had not yet become ﬁnal.

.

.

.

to guard, enforce,

and protect every

the Constitution 0f the United States.”). This Court should not

duty to ensure the constitutionality 0f Mr. Pizzuto’s death sentence because of what

in

an entirely separate judicial system. If there are serious scientiﬁc and constitutional

problems With

this

unquestionably

Court’s opinion upholding Mr. Pizzuto’s death sentence—as there

are,

and as the State barely even disputes—then

this

Court should endeavor t0 ﬁx

them, which requires an evidentiary hearing below.
Finally,

Mr. Pizzuto established in his Opening Brief that he has a constitutional

entitlement t0 an evidentiary hearing under

Brumﬁeld v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305
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(2015). See

AOB at

29—30. In the State’s View, the Court can ignore Brumﬁeld because

it

0f federal habeas procedure that are not germane here. See Ans. Br.
desire t0 be rid 0f the precedents

severely.

Brumﬁeld remanded

the state court “t0 foreclose

all

it

dislikes, the State

dealt With

at

42—43.

some questions

Much as

it

might

cannot plausibly limit Brumﬁeld so

for an evidentiary hearing because

it

was “unconstitutional”

further exploration of intellectual disability”

deciding that the inmate was not intellectually disabled Without affording

for

by summarily

him an opportunity

t0

present live testimony. 576 U.S. at 3 15. If the U.S. Supreme Court labels something

unconstitutional,

issue in

it is

Brumﬁeld is

unconstitutional—period. The standard of review that happened to be at
neither here nor there.

Brumﬁeld’s plain language

is

consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Mr. Pizzuto’s

case. In proposing further proceedings here, the

Ninth Circuit stressed that when “the Idaho

courts rejected Pizzuto’s Atkins claim in 2008, they did so Without the beneﬁt of an evidentiary

hearing,” and “without the beneﬁt 0f

Brumﬁeld that

“it is

.

.

.

Brumﬁeld,” and

unconstitutional to foreclose

all

Brumﬁeld is meaningless

it

had since been made

at

in these proceedings, there

would have been n0 reason

in other state-court systems.

orders on

for

now When they revisit their

denial of Mr. Pizzuto’s claim.

Opposing counsel’s reading ofBrumﬁeld

had

by

534—35. If the Attorney General were

the Ninth Circuit t0 suggest that the state courts consider the opinion

summary

clear

further exploration of intellectual disability”

based only 0n an above-70 IQ score. Pizzuto, 947 F.3d
correct that

that

when the

is

also at odds With the reception the case has

Those courts perceive Brumﬁeld

as giving

them

their

marching

Constitution compels an evidentiary hearing for claims 0f intellectual
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See Commonwealth

disability.

v.

Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 388 (Pa. 2019) (remanding for

consideration of the evidence under several
that that opinion “disapproved

new

authorities, including

an analysis that factored an individual’s adaptive strengths

preclude a hearing 0n the existence 0f adaptive deﬁcits”); Foster
(Fla.

Brumﬁeld, and observing

v.

State,

260 So. 3d 174, 181

2018) (per curiam) (granting an evidentiary hearing because the petitioner “must

afforded an opportunity to present evidence of intellectual disability” and citing, inter

Brumﬁeld); Walls

v.

State,

213 So. 3d 340,

though the defendant “had an

34647

(Fla.

is

now

entitled”

precedents), recededfrom 0n other grounds in Phillips

2563476,

at

*4—5

v.

now be
alia,

2016) (per curiam) (ﬁnding that even

earlier evidentiary hearing as to intellectual disability,”

receive the type of holistic review t0 which he

t0

“he did not

under Brumﬁeld and other

State, --- So.

3d

---, ----,

2020

new

WL

(Fla. 2020).

In short, other state courts have taken Brumﬁeld’s unequivocal language at face value and

seen in

it

a

roadmap

t0 determining

When an

evidentiary hearing 0n intellectual disability

constitutionally required. This Court should too,

and When

it

is

does the need for an evidentiary

hearing here becomes undeniable.

VI. Conclusion
Setting aside

a

man t0 be

all

the legal nuances, the question before the Court

is

simple: should

executed on the basis 0f an opinion that both parties and the federal judiciary

agree was unscientiﬁc

at the

Pizzuto believes the answer

time and would have been unconstitutional

is

if rendered

allow

now

now? Mr.

no, and he respectfully asks for the district court’s decision
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it

denying his Rule 60(b) motion to be reversed and for the case t0 be remanded so an evidentiary
hearing can be held.
Respectfully submitted this 15th day of July 2020.

/s/

Jonah

Jonah

J.

J.

Horwitz

Horwitz

Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant
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